175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175 648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority, whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 571 •182 *[613]

175 114 619 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
•182 very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
[793] Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[36] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
425 wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
[178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
•182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241 area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[312] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"
[361]

*613 423 •182 241 [312] in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It *613 182 184 241 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture. [231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own sheep.

656 423 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert. The government attempted it a number of times, but with little success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the 361 342 178 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the 361 648 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town. Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 [124] Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

• 182 179 *613 433 434

moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the internal and external systems of political relations.

As a result of the socialization process, and through relations with other members of the family, an individual comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

The value placed upon social order, and the structural mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship, residence and contract--inform an authority structure which ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another. Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson 1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his <u>washuun</u>, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, <u>washuun</u>, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his <u>washuun</u>, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo word, such as <u>'ammar</u> which in standard Arabic means "to fill" but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse," the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded from gatherings and activities in which his father participates, but he is also made to maintain a respectable social distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. bint 'amm) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. bint ibn
196 'amm, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term bint 'amm to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
•182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the bint 'amm over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my bint 'amm, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's bint 'amm." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a bint 'amm seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.
829

But one is able to differentiate between the various
582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins
196 make an initial dichotomy between the bint 'amm daira (daira =
*613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this
•[182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis
[578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 578 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings between two men they will place claims upon each other's sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The [182] [571] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis for social relationships between groups, regardless of any [586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then, that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making [182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her. 582 578 159 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the following informant's story indicates.

> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

582 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry,
578 so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to
159 take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be
578 an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-
829 cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a
[182] source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers."
582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and 585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with [574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important. The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are the grandparents of his children."

585 671 182 [574] [431] [782] The marriage, then, is only the first step in the ritualization of new group bonds established between the families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently intensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups * [613] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her husband's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made 585 * 613 551 571 182 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe, she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the [193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by referring to the women in their residence groups as al-Qinaishiyya or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine marker).

182 marker).

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[585] In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

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[182] Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX

The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief political value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

604
•182 war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

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[181]

There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

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[829]

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

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[539] brother to special place in the social structure states that "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus [539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation may be the basis for a new network of social relations by making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins [539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know the name of his khal not the name of his father." This statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties, is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

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578 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal." This, of course, does not mean that the individual should take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
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578 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 593 554 *182 578 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group, nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict. 562 593 554 182 578 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind together two groups which are structurally differentiated by the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-*613 [431] [628] [574] daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or tent for short visits. 562 593 554 [726] [584] During a time of conflict or war, the Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by individuals in both her husband's group and her father's 562 593 554 582 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter") because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 593 554 *613 182 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complementary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the practice of collaterally extending the term, khal, to include many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of bint 'amm, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an individual marries into an outside group, or even within the secondary group, the wife's brother becomes khal not only to the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (awlad) at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother as khali ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting age-mates of the local descent group.

Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group par excellence.

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
* 613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's widow so that she will have someone to help her with the children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
•182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
[582] advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a precaution against intensifying authority relations and the degree of segmentation.

decision-making which allocates values in society. This process orders the internal and external political relations of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate sole (Smith 1966).

The corporate group, although based on common interests and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships. Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951: 161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity. Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration. The corporate group and its authority structure is the mechanism which insures, through political means, the necessary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
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•182 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
121 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity, the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community" (Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

181 578 579 626 784 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict regulation.

*613 181 182 571 The role of 'aqila presents the corporate group as "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups. Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective 'aqila. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the 'aqila. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 571 182 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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the central value and traditional institution of 'aqila which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of 'aqila which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of

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the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of 'aqila deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The 'awaaqil of al-Qasr and the police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police will intervene only when their help is requested. The Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
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69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice could not be satisfied. One 'aqila said that "only the 'awaiyid
*613
682 Awlad 'Ali can maintain order because it stops wars through
•182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
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648 returned to his 'aqila; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his 'aqila. There are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
692
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 598 593 [604] Theoretically, as one 'aqila said, conflict should be stopped at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal uncle, and should never reach the level of the 'aqila. Once before the 'aqila, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father per se cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 598 •182 The 'aqila, who is responsible for internal order and external relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the political structure. The authority of the 'aqila is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single 'aqila must consult with the other 'awaaqil of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 559 571 171 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above) of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But [596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

[182]

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

175 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told
671 by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a
177 wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of
671 that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law,
177 derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-
[428] Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of
[562] Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the
•182 "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid
648 can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
597 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
571

181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
578 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
571 idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this is the case where the external system of authority relations is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
578 establishment of political order is better considered an
571 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
• 182 in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property, and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate. Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

571
672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
672
*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
•182 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
571 the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man, all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the diiya. All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case: "The wergilt debt as set by the judge was the most ancient debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it." Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case: ". . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of political relations, must be treated in connexion with the blood-feud." The blood-feud and the diiya are institutions by which authority groups interact and political order is maintained. Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over rights to land, water, and women which could have led to violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

Rules regarding the diiya in Bedouin society apply at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

*613 778 •182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-[305] eyed one"). If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle their own land disputes because the government's way of handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593 level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict regulation falling within the sphere of external political relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
•182 group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
•182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

[579] > . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea. An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
•182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and the political order sacralized in a public way at the conclusion of litigation when the parties involved and the 'aqila read the Fatiha (the first sura of the Quran). For the Bedouins, the 'awaiyid is the enactment of the word of God, and the man who follows the 'awaiyid follows the commandments of God. One 'aqila speaking of the final authority which directs Bedouin society said this:

> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads to "the good society." Another 'aqila, in reply to my question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

charters of Bedouin society, the rawaabit al-'awaaqil and the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be considered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon restitution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settlement of disputes.

Since neither a dichotamy between private and public delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentralized political system of the Bedouins, political action and type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not they occur in the internal political system of the secondary or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems of political action rests with the fact that the lex talionis, retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, compensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diiya and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse the diiya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms of social control and dispute settlement. A political office exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range of political action, and the process of adjudication and compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about

what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

Two cases of killing have been discussed previously. Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which occurred in the external political system at the various levels of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe; the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases. The third case presented below is a translation of an actual document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

683 578 *613 692 539 695

that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

578 682 *613 692 571 619 [177] [648]

The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 682 578 *613 [685]

Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

682 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas each paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only 30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E. All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait. This was a special case, it never happened before and will never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

423 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an
*613 individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is
423 property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
•182 political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally
(671) intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land, with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
•182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
[691]

I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
422 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
562 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
*613 jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

554 571 [579] [585] [796] [124] [431] It would be considered "wrong" for the members of this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party, or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent that they come to something such as this." In terms of

554 571 •182 561 [593] Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing," i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public role outside the confines of the father-son authority structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role, and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social intercourse. [114] At the five different Bedouin "parties" which I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
198 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr, then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be designated.

[092] The central place of the third party role in the Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; guwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
•182 stitutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

554 571 627 *613 •[182] politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the role of 'aqila, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 571 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles, and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization characterized by any one role as compared to another. I have already discussed the way in which the role of 'aqila differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles) in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following [128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized aspect of the authority structure, on power and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity of role differentiation. Within any one culture it 554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political 571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally 627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority *[613] structure being divided between the 'aqila and the third party. What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The [792] exception to this is the rajal saalih who derives his power or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

554 571 627 Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

554 571 182 613 This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of institutionalization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is

554 571 182 627 institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

554 When power is
571 institutionalized, such as it is in the role of 'aqila, it
•182 becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and
*[613] authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter,
(128) I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

554 When we contrast the roles of 'aqila and rajal khair,
571 we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to dif-
*613 ferentiate between the two roles further than we already have,
627

554 One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in
571 dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of
*613 the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict
627 regulation:
[539]

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

554 Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically
571 linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client
627 relationship permit this fact to influence their own inter-
829 pretation of the authority structure. A common view of the
*613 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

[539]

> There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

554 The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin
571 society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one
627
•182

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
•182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
[556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One 'aqila claimed that the rajal khair is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] 'aqila is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] Fatiha, the first sura of the Quran, in order to terminate the problem; this is beyond the rights of the rajal khair whose influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of rajal khair does have its "sacred" aspects, for all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a rajal khair or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same thing said about the 'aqila.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the rajal
627 khair was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent 'aqila. The role never became institutionalized
•182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure dominated by that of the 'aqila. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation. Besides the rajal khair, an example of this would be the traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
[182] point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
* 613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpre-
meditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. This is true whether the process is carried on b y means of informal mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 731 464 434 182 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs. The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way 613 182 682 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, especially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One important gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the Amar paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. 613 682 578 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 675 578 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggarty, led many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
554
627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
[556] position as a Government Sheihk, he is believed to have influencial connections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaqil to conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaqil. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheihk Selouma, the Aggary Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaqil is very rare al-
613 though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaqil
682 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
• [182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collection of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
613 the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
682 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
578 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

627 agreement is reached. In fact, later one of the people attending said
628 that my presence made everything run smoothly in that particular Mi'ad
[123] because they felt that they should show me how peaceful Awlad Ali were. This was mainly supported by my own observation of other Mi'ads, some of which are described later, where parties were less understanding of one another and where no forfeiting of any part of the compensation occurs. This is particularly true when the Mi'ad is held to acknowledge the failure of the negotiators to reach an acceptable agreement among the parties.
[181] This is also true when one of the parties to a dispute denies the charge and insists on not paying any kind of compensation. In such cases the Mi'ad is held to decide upon a different course of action, usually the administration of the oath, as will be discussed later in the chapter.
[182] Despite its typical nature, the Mi'ad described above exemplifies the nature of the Mi'ad and its purpose as a process of making public what has been achieved in private negotiations. No evidence is presented and evaluated in the Mi'ad, no hearing of witnesses, no passing of judgment based on the evaluation of the facts of the case. Actually, the facts of the case are never presented and a person who is not acquainted with them before hand has no way of learning what the dispute is all about by merely listening to the discussions of the Mi'ad.

628 The key role in the process of mediation in dispute settlements is
613 done by the Aqila or the leader of the bait. When a dispute occurs between members of different baits, each party goes to the Aqila of his bait who takes immediate steps tomeet with the Aqila of the other party and discuss the matter with him in an attempt to reach a settlement. He acts as a representative of members of his bait and defends their interests in

613 a request and examine the reasons behind it in an attempt to remedy them
681 if possible. They have to be sure first of all that by his request the person is not avoiding the paymnet of his share in a particular case.
[695] If this is proven to be the case, then no barawa is granted unless the person pays all his debts to the amar. This, like the amar's barawa of the individual, has to be put in writing.

613 I left the area a month after the meeting held at Qudura's camp.
578 By the time I left, bait Asabei' was almost in a chaotic situation.
[114] Many thought that the outcome would be in favor of Qudura, who would emerge from all the happenings as the leader of bait Asabei' as a whole. Others thought that the only possible outcome was for bait Asabei' to be divided into two or even three separate units with their own respective leaders.

Analysis

114 All events of the second phase occurred while I was in the area.
627 Nonetheless I was not able to observe directly all of these events, due to the nature of the judicial process among Awlad Ali which relies, as has been mentioned earlier, on informal mediation and influence, rather than on formal court hearings. Most of the above events happened behind
[124] closed doors and with a great amount of secrecy. For this reason I had to rely partly on informants' accounts of what exactly had happened between the parties involved.

613 The dispute in its two phases revealed a major weakness in the
627 social structure of the major bait of the Aggary family. As the events
182 of the case unfolded, they shed light on some of the important principles

613 underlying the authority of the Aqila and the source of his political
627 support. Three such principles were evident in the above case: patri-
182 lineal succession, wealth, and social and personal renown.


Ability to deal fairly with disputes involving members of his bait and outsiders
(wisdom and social renown)
Ability to fulfil financial obligations of the bait (wealth)
Patrilineal succession
other tribal groups
'Eila
Bait

613 To better understand the importance of the three principles to the
554 authority of the Aqila, it is important to examine the domains within the Aqila normally functions. First, the Aqila is the leader of a certain kinship unit: the bait. Historically, the bait has been the main field of action for the Aqila and from it he draws his main political support.
613 As the leader of his bait, the Aqila settles disputes among members of
627 his bait and represents the group for political and administrative pur-
554 poses. His function is to hold the bait together by preventing major disputes between members from leading to the fission of the group into smaller, separate units. He performs his function by exercising authority and/or personal influence to establish long-lasting agreements.

613 627 554 [192] The word mardi is derived from the Arabic verb "yardi" which means to accept or agree upon. The mardi therefore is the person who is accepted by one or both parties to a dispute as a mediator. If he is accepted by only one of the parties, his work is more that of a legal representative of that party. He makes all efforts, using all powers of persuasion to get the other party to concede to the demands of the party he represents. If, on the other hand, he is chosed by both parties to a dispute, he acts as an impartial judge and avoids taking sides in the case. His fame is determined by his ability to achieve permanent, long-lasting settlements. His success in this area depends, in addition to personal qualities, upon the respect he has within his own tribal segment and the weight that tribal segment has among other tribal segments. Similarly, his success and the fame he gets as a mardi may give him considerable influence within the bait. But this influence does not develop [182] [428] into authority because the mardi in this case does not have an established basis for the effective maintenance of that authority, in this case, patrilineal succession.

613 554 682 The other domain within which the Aqila performs his duties is that of the Eila or the amar. His main function within this area is to represent his bait in matters involving the collection or the distribution of bloodmoney within the vengeance group. Within the amar, the aqila is considered successful insofar as he is able to fulfill his bait's financial obligations to the amar. This ability is in turn determined by his success in collecting money from individual members of his bait and/or his willingness to pay from his own money for those members who are unable or unwilling to pay their share. Where kinship ties are strong, the Aqila

634 554 619 "The omda or sheikh is both a blessing and a curse to his tribe," said one member of the Aggary 'eila. "He can bring benefits to his tribe, but at the same time, he has to report his own people if one of them breaks the city laws... His position is like that of a double-edged razor."

Most of the people in the area, however, tolerate the negative aspects of the omda's functions as a moderate price for the possible benefits they may get through his position. This is why each tribal segment does its best to be represented by an omda, or at least by a sheikh.

Within his tribal segment he enjoys a great deal of respect. He does not, by means of position alone, command any power over members of his group similar to the power the omda of the village has over his people. It seems, however, that although the position itself does not [613] carry with it any power, yet, when the holder of that position is at the same time a native tribal leader or aqila, it tends to enhance his position as a tribal leader and to give him more respect among members of his tribal unit as well as among the rest of the tribal groupings. 634 554 619 This may be explained by the fact that the establishment of the omda system in that area did not involve direct interference with the native political system except in a minimal way, mainly to keep the tribal • 182 657 613 populations in the area from interfering in the progress of various government projects in the area. As such, the system did not impose too many demands upon the tribal loyalties of the omdas or sheikhs. In the relationship between the government and the tribal population, the balance so far has been in favor of the latter, who, by means of

634 omda representation, are taking from the government much more than
554
619 they are giving in return. Being the link between his people and
182 the government in such a system gives the aqila a new basis of
657 political support.
613

583 [584] Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the completion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but 583 178 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money. This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and 583 178 184 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock, but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the 583 [584] [182] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage created between the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an insurance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife. 583 593 586 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked. [591] [592] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the marriage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's household even after marriage.

CHAPTER VI

HOMICIDE AND BODILY INJURIES

Part 1: Homicide

579 Fighting is quite common among Awlad Ali. Many of these fights involve a large number of individuals and result in many casualties 579 and sometimes even deaths. Fighting is considered "shar," or evil, 673 for according to Awlad Ali, it threatens the social cohesion which is 182 highly valued in the area. Yet, although undesirable, fighting and [682] even homicide are not considered a crime against society and sometimes are viewed as necessary to safeguard individual and collective rights in the absence of an established authority which could protect these [177] rights. Although this absence of an authority is remedied now by the [692] introduction of state administrative justice, this has not yet achieved enough efficiency and recognition to replace the old tribal system.

619 In the tribal system, there is no concept of individual punishment 681 inflicted upon the suspect. There is no recognized authority to inflict 692 it. The mardi or the 'aqila who performs the function of dispute settle- [629] ment in the case of homicide has no power to pass or inflict any punishment. His role is restricted to mediation between the two parties involved 682 as was earlier mentioned. Homicide, like all other wrongs among Awlad Ali, 673 are private wrongs affecting the individual or a group of individuals. [182] The main purpose of the tribal proceedings in the case of homicide is to restore some form of harmony and order among the group. This harmony is sometimes restored by killing the murderer or any member of his vengeance 682 group, or amar. Feuds may result from such killing, and a few instances 628 of feuds have, in fact, been recorded in the area (although not in the

105 The judicial process among Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt has been dealt with in the context of political organization of the group. The main feature of the political organization of Awlad Ali 105 613 is the absence of centralized leadership. The only formally recognized leadership is that of the aqila, the leader of the bait tribal segment. 105 The sources of the aqila's authority derive from a number of sources, 613 one of which is his judicial role. It is through him that disputes in- 629 volving members of his bait are solved. The process by which he performs this crucial function is that of informal mediation in which both the personal qualities of the aqila, as well as the weight of his tribal segment, play an important role. This is especially important in a [692] society with no court system or formal hearing and where durability of any settlement depends on its being accepted by the parties involved.

105 The main aim of the judicial process is to affect reconciliation of 182 the parties and to restore a certain degree of social order and cohesion 629 that was disrupted by the dispute. The need to restore the social order [619] and to maintain friendly relations between tribal members is a response to certain aspects of the natural and social environment in which the 105 group finds itself. Natural resources in the area are very meager, and 182 subsistence activities require that the tribesmen constantly move with 619 their herds for pasture throughout an area already divided among the 233 various tribal segments. Since the place and nature of pasture differ from one year to the next, the identity of the specific tribal unit which would be sought for help varies correspondingly. This creates a general feeling of dependency that characterizes the social relations in the area.

105 On the other hand, there is always a feeling of rivalry and hostility
578 between the different tribal segments which goes back to the era of
571 tribal warfare. Thus, the social relations among the tribal population are characterized by a certain amount of ambivalence which is hidden behind a facade of formality in the way tribal members treat one another
105 in day-to-day activities. There are certain rules of etiquette describ-
571 ing the way members of the same tribal segment should behave toward one
576 another and toward other tribesmen and outsiders. Failure to abide by
[289] these rules may subject the violator to a symbolic fine of a goat or a
574 sheep slaughtered for a feast to which everyone is invited. These feasts,
[182] or dinners as they are called, have various functions, the most important of which is the integrative one. In an area where the population is usu-
105 ally dispersed, these dinners offer an opportunity to the tribesmen who
574 happen to be in the area at the time of the feast to attend, where they
182 eat, meet other tribesmen, and exchange information about what is happening in other parts of the area. It is from such dinners that the tribesmen get to know about the available pastures, about the prices of sheep and goats in different markets, and about who is doing what and where. The occasion also signifies the restoration of the violator of the rules to the social life of the group and the reinforcement of those rules.
105 This is also true with the tribal meetings, or mi'ad, which are held to
629 announce settlements in more serious cases. It is on this basis that
182 the mi'ad should not be considered as a tribal court. It is more of a
289 social occasion where food and drinks are served and where parties in-
574 volved and all those invited by them talk about everything except the
[289] dispute itself. In certain instances, the financial settlement agreed upon in the informal mediation is exaggerated when announced in the mi'ad

105 629 182 681 554 so that part of it may be reduced in honor of some prominent members who are attending the meeting. When part of the financial agreement is reduced in honor of a person, this creates an obligation on the part of that person to reciprocate in a similar situation when one arises. This creates an active interest in the settlement on the part of individuals who otherwise are not involved, and insures the durability of the settlement. The social cohesion is maintained.

105 571 578 627 182 The need to keep friendly relations with all tribesmen is reflected in the judicial process in its procedural aspect, as well as in judicial reasoning, that is, the logic according to which facts in certain cases are assessed. With regard to procedures, there is an emphasis on avoiding face-to-face confrontations between the disputing parties until an agreement has been reached by means of the mediators. Only then is it that the parties see and talk to one another. This is especially true in serious cases such as homicide or serious assault where face-to-face confrontation is likely to lead to more hostilities.

105 571 627 182 The emphasis on reconciliation may explain, at least in part, the informality of the judicial process. Leaving the process of dispute settlement informal gives it a measure of flexibility which permits the treatment of each case as unique without being tied down by rigid formal rules. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules to be followed, or that there is no place for legal precedents. It simply means that the rules are very general and that the legal precedents are used merely as a guide in solving similar cases. The main guide remains, however, the desire to achieve a successful settlement that satisfies all parties. It is only through achieving such successful settlements that the social order is maintained and the tribal cohesion is secured.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

795* [792] [798] [796] [798]

divine blessing, since it was because the Bedouin believed the Sanusi family had the same virtue that they accepted their leadership.

The resemblance often alleged between the Sanusi and the Wahhabi movements, on the grounds of like puritanism, literalism, and fanaticism, cannot be substantiated. It is obvious that there must be resemblances between new religious movements: they usually claim to be a return to primitive faith and morals and they are generally missionary and enthusiastic. There is no great significance in such common characteristics of the two movements. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Grand Sanusi was directly influenced by Wahhabi propaganda. A more significant comparison between the two might be made by tracing their developments from religious into political movements. Both started as religious revivals among backward peoples, chiefly Bedouin, the Wahhabi movement in the Nadj in the eighteenth century and the Sanusi movement first in the Hijaz and then in Cyrenaica in the middle of the nineteenth century; the *Ikhwan* organizations of the two movements have much in common; and both ended in the formation of Amirates, or small Islamic States.

795* 171 (114)

Both movements have created States, the Wahhabi in Arabia and the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, based explicitly on religious particularism. In doing so they have only done what any movement of the kind is bound to do in a barbarous country if it is to continue to exist, namely, to create an administrative system which would ensure a measure of peace, security, justice, and economic stability. A religious organization cannot exist apart from a polity of a wider kind. But they did not create the sentiment of community which made the growth of governmental functions and the emergence of a State possible.

795* 182 177 171

Religious divisions in Islam have commonly been the expression of a sense of social and cultural exclusiveness. The support given to the 'Alids in Persia and Arabia, to the Umayyads in Africa and Spain, to the Fatimids in Egypt, to the Kharijites by the Berbers in North Africa, and the adoption of extreme Shi'ite doctrines by the mountaineers of Syria and by the Kurds, and of Isma'ili teachings in parts of India, were all reactions against foreign domination as much as revolts against orthodoxy. The religious deviation was the expression of the intense desire

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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of a people to live according to their own traditions and institutions. To-day this desire is expressed in the political language of nationalism. In the past it was expressed in religious movements. Arab nationalism is not a new phenomenon. Only its dress is new.

As will be seen in the chapters which follow, conditions in Cyrenaica were particularly favourable to the growth of a politico-religious movement such as the Sanusiya became. It was cut off by deserts from neighbouring countries, it had a homogeneous population, it had a tribal system which embraced common traditions and a strong feeling of community of blood, the country was not dominated by the towns, and the Turkish administration exercised very little control over the interior. It was, as will be seen, the tribal system of the Bedouin which furnished the Order with its political foundations just as it was the tribesmen of the country whose hardiness and courage enabled it to stand up to the succession of defeats it had to endure.

The reasons for the political success of the Sanusiya Order in Cyrenaica will appear in the course of this account, and here I wish to draw attention to one of them only. It has been said that its rites and teachings were, like the Bedouin character, austere without being fanatical, and that it tolerated the cult of saints to which the Bedouin were accustomed, the Grand Sanusi becoming, in fact, a kind of national saint; but it must be added that the acceptability of its teachings and the fact that the Grand Sanusi could at once be placed by the Bedouin in the familiar category of *Marabtin*, holy men coming to preach and settle in Cyrenaica from the west, cannot alone account for the remarkable success of the Sanusiya movement. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica had heard similar teachings before from similar teachers and had paid them the same degree of attention as they paid to the Grand Sanusi, but these earlier missionaries won only a personal and local following for themselves and their descendants, whereas the Grand Sanusi established himself and his family as leaders of a national movement, a position they have now held for three generations. Leaving aside the remarkable personality of the Grand Sanusi and without here discussing whether the time at which he taught was particularly favourable to the growth of the move-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9.
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ment to which his teachings led, it may be said that the great difference between the Grand Sanusi and the earlier holy men whose tombs are homely landmarks all over Cyrenaica was that, while they were, all of them, in the eyes of the Bedouin, Marabouts, the Grand Sanusi was also the head of an Order which gave to him and his successors an organization. Moreover, unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization intact and keep control of it. This they were able to do by co-ordinating the lodges of the Order to the tribal structure.

III

The more recent Islamic Orders are to be found principally in North and West Africa. The Sanusiya is one of the most recent of them. Its founder was an Algerian scholar, al-Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi al-Khattabi al-Idrisi al-Hasani, a very remarkable man, mystic, missionary, and Marabout. The Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi is usually spoken of in Cyrenaica as *al-Sanusi al-Kabir*, the Grand Sanusi, and I generally refer to him thus in this book.

The Grand Sanusi was born of a distinguished family of Sharifs at a village near Mustaghanim in Algeria about 1787. Early in life he became noted for his intelligence, piety, and profound learning, considered fitting ornaments to his noble birth. He studied first at Mustaghanim, then at Mazun, and later at the famous mosque school at Fez in Morocco, where he learnt theology, jurisprudence, exegesis of the Koran, and the other usual subjects of a Muslim student of the time. There he seems to have developed an interest in mysticism, having come under the influence of the Moroccan Order of the Tijaniya Darwishes. He left Fez when in the early thirties in order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, though a Turkish biographer says that one of his reasons for leaving Morocco was to avoid possible unpleasantness with the authorities, who were alarmed lest his propaganda for the greater unity of Islam, his life's aim, might have political consequences.[1] They had small cause for alarm as his efforts seem to have made little impression on the

[1] Salim bin 'Amir, *Majallat 'Umar al-Mukhtar*, No. II, 1943–4, p. 2.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*795 *175 [159] [793] *[648] provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, the Order had no choice but to resist.

But though it was attacks from the outside which destroyed the theocratic empire of the Sanusiya, it may be considered doubtful whether in any case such extensive territories could have been maintained under single direction. The economic and political organization of the Order was crude, even when elaborated in the days of Sayyid al-Mahdi in response to increased trading activities and to the need of maintaining peace in the petty and barbarous states that had come under its influence. Its administrative machinery was at no time adequate for effective control over such wide domains, with their poor communications and their manifold tribal, racial, and cultural divergencies. [578] To these weaknesses must be added, after Sayyid al-Mahdi's death, personal rivalries within the Sanusi family on the lines of which cracks began to appear in the loose empire, and it is probable that even if it had not been attacked by the Powers of Europe it would have broken up into a number of principalities, or spheres of religious influence, ruled by various members of the family. It might indeed be * [648] possible to sustain the thesis that it was the Italian occupation of Libya [182] which prevented the complete break-up of the Order by rallying the outraged sentiment of the Bedouin to its side as the symbol of their common resistance to conquest and alien rule.

The administrative organization of the Order in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi was simple indeed. Each lodge of the Order [794] lived on its own revenues, derived from endowments, tithes, contributions of money, goods, transport, and labour, and sent its surplus to Jaghbub and Kufra for the maintenance of the University and of the Sanusi family and for the general purposes of the Order. The Shaikh of each lodge arbitrated in disputes [628] in the district in which it was situated and could generally wield spiritual sanctions sufficiently weighty to compel acceptance of his awards. The Shaikh of a lodge was appointed by the head of the Order and was responsible to him. There was, however, so little centralized planning that new lodges seem occasionally to have been founded by the initiative of influential families without the head of the Order hearing of the new foundation till its completion. In the more distant parts

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243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with [251] the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years, the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant [433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the *barqa* up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times [439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling for the years 1885 to 1900.[1] Much of this surplus was bought by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a
433 good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from
439 the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as
182 necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice,
[237] and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country. They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool, clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in
[556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes
[233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban
[464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own
[511] labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps more important is that they are prepared to live on what

[1] G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Europeans consider to be a low level of civilization. They do not feel the need for expensive roads and ports, electric light, wireless sets, telephones, schools, churches, newspapers, and so forth; and clearly their economy could not support them. Time and again colonists, tempted from their homes by the short sea routes and the wooded plateau, have settled in the country and dispossessed the Bedouin, but in the end it is the Bedouin, and not the colonists, who have survived. When one looks at the massive Phoenician, Greek, Egyptian, and Roman ruins and the already half-ruined Italian towns, villages, and farms, and then on the flimsy tents of the Arabs, one cannot but reflect that the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong.

III

Even in the steppe country it is difficult to find a Bedouin *naja'*, camp, for the camps are pitched in hollows and on the slopes of wadis and their feeders for shelter from rain and wind and too many visitors. On the plateau they are hidden in the forest. One cannot, therefore, make more than a very approximate estimate of the population of any part of the country, or of its distribution, by bare observation. It can, however, be said that at present the country is underpopulated and that the population is badly distributed between town and country, the urban part of it, which is almost entirely unproductive, being too large in relation to the whole.

There have been a number of estimates of the population by early travellers who visited the country in Turkish times. They had to make a guess at the population figure, aided by Turkish censuses. It has been suggested on the basis of their reports that the country then supported round about 250,000 souls.[1] The Turkish census of 1911 gave the population as 198,345, excluding Kufra.[2] Taking into account the various estimates which were made during the Italo-Sanusi wars, in the interval between them, and since, it may be said that to-day the total population of Cyrenaica is probably round about 200,000, of whom about a quarter live in the towns, the remainder being tented Bedouin and a few thousand oasis dwellers.

[1] Dr. Gotthold Hildebrandt, *Cyrenaika als Gebiet künftiger Besiedelung*, 1904, p. 317.

[2] Coro, op. cit., p. 20.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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778 619 792 776 to act as mediators between tribes and between one tribal section and another. Even to-day their tombs are regarded as neutral points, as it were, and are often the place chosen for a meeting between the Shaikhs of one tribe, or tribal section, and those of an adjacent tribe, or section, when some matter has to be settled between them. It has sometimes happened also that when two tribes have disputed the ownership of territory, they have settled the dispute by allotting it to a Marabout, which means to his descendants, so that one then finds a *Marabtin* strip between two *Sa'adi* tribes or tribal sections. One of the best examples of this is the strip of country owned by the Aulad al-Shaikh tribe between the 'Awaqir and the 'Abid and 'Arafa tribal domains. In the same way tribes made gifts of disputed wells to dead saints. Where a *Marabtin* tribe has grown out of a Marabout family they will be found living in the area around their tombs. Thus the Aulad al-Shaikh territory spreads out from Sidi Mahiyus, part of the Masamir live near Sidi Nuh, the Mshaitat live around Sidi al-Mshaiti, and the Qat'an live near Sidi Hashim and Sidi Suliman al-Tair.

792 776 212 554 So, long centuries before the Grand Sanusi began his mission in Cyrenaica, the Bedouin were used to the sight of an *'alim*, a learned man—for anyone who can read and write is a learned man to the Bedouin—coming from the west to heal their children and beasts, break droughts, write talismans, and teach them the beliefs and law of Islam. Such a man was also a *muhakkam*, one who arbitrated in their disputes and said the *fatiha* at their settlements and undertakings to make them binding. He could arbitrate among them because he was not of them. He was not like them a tented son of the steppe, though his descendants may have learned to live as such, but a *Marabat*, a man who follows religion and not the rains. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica owe much to these holy men, for, ignorant and superstitious though they may have been, they taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion and kept those twin lights burning, even if dimly, through centuries. The Bedouin do not forget them, or to say a prayer for them, when they pass their tombs; and they have given the freedom of their earth and water to their descendants. Without these forerunners the Grand Sanusi could not have planted his Order in the country. [182] [795] It is planted in their bones.

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Marabouts of the kind I have described were still coming to Cyrenaica from the west up to the time when the Grand Sanusi began his preaching in the country. Two of them whom he found there, already living among the Bedouin, the one on the western and the other on the eastern part of the plateau, teaching them and settling their disputes, became his followers: Sidi Ahmad bin 'Abdalla al-Sakkuri, a late arrival from the west whose descendants became Shaikhs of the zawiya of al-Marj, and Sidi al-Martadi Farkash, of an old *Marabtin* family of Cyrenaica, whose descendants became Shaikhs of the lodges at Umm al-Razam, Bishara, and Martuba. But the great majority of the Grand Sanusi's helpers were men who had come with him from the west, chiefly from Algeria. Other *Ikhwan* families, mostly of the Khattabi lineage, of which the Sanusi family are a branch, came later, also from Algeria, in the time of Sayyid al-Mahdi. To the Bedouin they were all Marabouts and when they had in their lifetimes a reputation for piety or learning their tombs in the Sanusiya lodges in which they resided became places of cult like those of their forerunners all over Cyrenaica. But unlike the earlier Marabouts these Sanusiya Brothers were not only holy men. They were also members of a fraternity, of an organization. The Sanusiya Order was thus not only heir to the accumulated capital of the Marabouts, but was able to exploit it as a corporation. It incorporated a number of isolated cults into a single wider cult, fractionized, it is true, by tribal particularisms, but, all the same, brought under a common organization. Each lodge of the Order was a cult centre, but it was something more: it was part of a general cult directed through the lodges towards the Head of the Order. The tribes of Cyrenaica became through the Order linked from above in a common, if loose, organization under a single, sacred, Head. This was possible only because a tribal system already existed uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common lineage structure.

What gave stability to this new relationship between the Bedouin tribes and the Sanusiya Order, turning the sacred Head into a secular leader and the religious organization into a government, and changed a loose federation of tribes into a

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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nation, was common hostility to outside interference, an ingredient supplied in measured quantities by the Turks and copiously by the Italians.

III

The rudiments of Islam which the Grand Sanusi found in Cyrenaica made his teachings acceptable, delivered as they were without embellishments, to the Bedouin of the country, and the Marabout tradition which he also found there made him personally acceptable to them. His chief difficulty must have been the rivalries between tribe and tribe and between tribal section and tribal section down to the smallest sections. This difficulty was overcome by transferring the centre of the Order to desert oases, where it could not become identified with any particular tribe, and by distributing its lodges impartially throughout the tribal territories.

Of the forty-five zawiyas belonging to the tribes of Cyrenaica proper (including al-Naufiliya and excluding the Kufra lodges) probably twenty-one were founded before 1860 or during the lifetime of the Grand Sanusi, twenty-two during the lifetime of Sayyid al-Mahdi, and two when Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was Head of the Order.

A high proportion of the lodges of the Order in the time of the Grand Sanusi were along the line of oases on the 29th parallel, for to the lodges of the Cyrenaican oases on that line must be added those in the oases of the Sirtica, Zalla, Saukna, Hun, and Waddan, all founded round about 1855, and probably that in al-Fuqha also. Lodges were early planted in the oases partly on account of their importance as caravanserai and trading centres, partly because the oases-folk were more tractable than the Bedouin, and partly because the stability of these centres gave greater opportunity for corporate religious life. The Sanusiya certainly made a deeper religious impression on the peoples of the oases than on the Bedouin.

It will have been noticed also how few of the Sanusiya lodges were founded in the towns of North Africa. There are no lodges in the towns of Egypt and though the Order counts many followers in the towns of Cyrenaica and is politically dominant in them it has only one zawiya in each, Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj; and that at Banghazi, the capital of the country, was

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only founded about 1870. The Sanusiya lodge in Tripoli town was not built till 1882. It must, however, be remembered that in Turkish times Banghazi and Darna were little more than villages and al-Marj only a military post and that, as already explained, their inhabitants were foreigners, either Jews or immigrants from Tripolitanian towns who were generally affiliated already to other Orders. Moreover, the Turkish administration functioned from these centres, and that alone would have prevented the Grand Sanusi from making them the headquarters of his mission. There could not be two governments in one large village, especially as the Grand Sanusi disapproved of the Turks and they were suspicious of him. Also the presence of the Turkish Government in the towns ensured order and some, even if very small, opportunities for education and religious instruction and services, and Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi had settled in Cyrenaica with the express purpose of reviving the faith and raising the culture of the totally illiterate and almost heathen Bedouin, whose contact with the towns was negligible. The social functions carried out by the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica were more consistent with settlement among wild tribesmen than among peaceful citizens. Propaganda of the faith, educational work, cultivation of gardens, settlement of disputes, provision of shelter, hospitality, and security to travellers, and of refuge for the pursued, the weak, and the oppressed are all functions especially appropriate to tribal and barbarous conditions of life

The Order was based on the tribes and not on the towns. The lodges were founded by tribes or tribal sections and the tribes or their sections regarded them as tribal institutions. Al-Qasur zawiya was not just a lodge of the Order in 'Abid tribal territory. It was the 'Abid zawiya; just as al-Marj was the 'Arafa zawiya, Shahhat the Hasa zawiya, and so on. The tribal system and the Sanusiya organization interpenetrated. The Sanusiya gave to the tribes a national symbol and the tribes participated in it through their lodges. It was the combination of a common organization with representation that allowed for tribal allegiances and rivalries which provided the Order with sure foundations.

So much was the Sanusiya organization based on the tribal system that the distribution of the lodges may be said to

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states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultivations and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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opportunity to worship in a mosque, and that by charity to their lodges they might earn recompense hereafter.

Each lodge had its Shaikh, who represented the Head of the Order. He arbitrated between the Bedouin, led the tribesmen to holy war, acted as intermediary between the tribe or section and the Turkish administration, dispensed hospitality to travellers, supervised the collection of tithe, directed cultivation of grain and care of stock, dispatched surplus revenues to the Headquarters of the Order, acted as prayer-leader on Fridays, and assisted in preaching and teaching. There were besides a number of other functionaries among the Brothers: the Shaikh's deputy, the *imam* to lead the daily prayers and to teach the Koran and canon law, the *mu'allim* to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic in the zawiya school, and perhaps a special *muadhdhin* to call the faithful to prayer, though any of the Brothers could do that.

V

In principle, as we have noted, the lands attached to lodges belonged, like the lodges themselves, to the Order, and more particularly to the lodge to which they were donated, and not to any particular individual or family. In practice certain Shaikhly families tended to gain an hereditary interest in them. What happened in the early days of the Order was that a Shaikh was sent by its Head to found a lodge and when it was established he was translated to a fresh missionary field. Shaikhs of lodges were in this way moved fairly frequently at first, but it later became the practice to leave a Shaikh in charge till his death and then to nominate his successor from among his kinsmen, with the approval of the tribe and on the advice of Shaikhs of neighbouring lodges. What mostly seems to have happened was that the tribal sections concerned asked for a son or brother of the last Shaikh to be appointed director of their lodge and the Head of the Order confirmed their choice. As one Darsi tribesman put it: 'The Shaikh of our zawiya must be a man favoured by the hearts of the people.' In course of time the tendency for the Shaikhship of a lodge to be regarded as hereditary became very marked, it being understood that if there was a suitable candidate from the family already established in the lodge he would be appointed, a view with which the later Heads of the

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find hereditary transmission of Shaikhship of lodges most accentuated, such as the Bara'asa-Tamia section (al-Zawiya al-Baida), the 'Awaqir-Sdaidi section (Msus zawiya), and the 'Abaidat-Ghaith section (Tart zawiya). In the same way the earlier Marabouts became, as has been noted, founders of lineages which were on the pattern of the branches of the Bedouin clans among whom they lived, and attached to them.

Also it must be remembered that the lodges were tribal institutions built by the local Bedouin so that they might participate in the *baraka* of Sayyid Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi. They participated in it through the Shaikhs of their zawiyas who received their *baraka* direct from the hands of the Grand Sanusi himself, or from the hands of son Sayyid al-Mahdi, and passed it on to their sons. This *baraka* belonged to the tribe, or tribal section, which built a lodge just as the *shaukha*, the secular Shaikhship of the tribe, or tribal section, belonged to it and had to be kept in it. In both the continuity of family succession had to be maintained, unless there were good reasons for acting otherwise. Thus each tribal section emphasized its autonomy in its hereditary line of religious Shaikhs, through whom the *baraka* of the founder of the Order was transmitted to them, whilst proclaiming its membership of a tribal federation with common allegiance to the Head of the Order.

As I have pointed out when speaking of the sacred *Marabtin* tribes of Cyrenaica, it was customary for the descendants of a Marabout to reside near his tomb. I have further mentioned that the Shaikh of a Sanusiya lodge, who is also called a *Marabat* by the Bedouin, might, if he had during life a reputation for piety, rather easily gained in Islam, be venerated as a saint when he was dead and his tomb become a shrine. This is another reason why Shaikhly families have tended to become hereditary directors of lodges.

Just as almost all the Marabouts of Cyrenaica were foreigners from the west, so were almost all the Shaikhs of the Sanusiya lodges. The Dardafi and Isma'ili families came from Tripolitania, the Ghumari family from Morocco, the 'Ammur, Bu Jibali, and Khattab families came from Algeria, and so on. As a class they enjoyed, and still enjoy, a reputation for sanctity among the Bedouin on account of their knowledge of the Koran

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*795 554 *648 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade. [178] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 121 182 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

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of their affiliations. Hence the Sanusiya does not oppose the other Orders in the towns on a religious plane, although it does not approve of those which are convulsionary, and they do not compete with it politically. It is only in the interior that the Order will not permit a rival, because competition for the allegiance of the Bedouin must be political. Italian efforts to play off these Orders against the Sanusiya were founded on ignorance of the nature of an Islamic *tariqa* and seem to have been ineffectual.

Since almost all the non-Sanusiya lodges are urban it follows that the history of the growth and spread of the Orders is part of the general history of the growth and spread of the urban centres of Cyrenaica. Some of the older lodges in Benghazi and Darna are over 150 years old, but most of them and all those in the smaller administrative centres date from late Turkish times or were built during the Italian occupation. An urban lodge is generally a small, very simple, structure and its members seldom total more than 50 to 100. It may be regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises, for the performance of good works, and for social insurance. It also serves as a resthouse for travelling members of the Order and as a *malja*, a place of refuge for the poor and the sick. Few of the lodges are endowed, and most are very poor.

I do not wish to underestimate the social and, in the broadest sense, political importance of the urban Orders in Cyrenaica. They provide the only spontaneous and co-operative associations in the towns and thus fill a gap for ordinary people both in the town society and in a religion which pays little attention either to corporeal works or, outside the mosques, to corporate worship. Outside the lodges of the Orders there were in Turkish times no associations dispensing charity or giving education, and worship in the mosques within the wide society of Islam does not provide the intimacy and colour men need in acts of common devotion. The lodges give to their members a double attachment and a double security, membership of a welfare association, which gives them a feeling of material security, and membership of a devotional group, which gives them a feeling of spiritual security. Also, in spite of their lack of numbers and organization, the urban lodges are links in chains which, running through Islamic countries and cutting across natural

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4.5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*795 • 182 and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

*795 369 182 [668] But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions [186] of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose inter-tribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this [575] was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aïssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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residential community but felt no strong obligation to one another nor the need for common action. Religious Orders in such communities tend to become fractionized along the lines of social cleavage into sub-urban and sub-sub-urban lodges, each serving a few families in its vicinity and leading its own life with its own following and resources independently of the others. Social life in the towns is amorphous. There is no structure corresponding to the tribal system. The Sanusiya became dominant because it shunned the towns and sought its converts among the Bedouin and built its centres within the tribes. The Sanusiya Brotherhood was founded on a Bedouin brotherhood.

It is of great interest to note that the Sanusiya held a place in relation to other Orders in western Arabia like to that which it held in Cyrenaica. The learned Dutch Arabist, Snouck Hurgronje, who spent a year in western Arabia in 1884 and 1885, states that in the towns the Order 'has remained to this day highly honoured, but by no means overtopping its sister orders. For the districts of the Hejaz, inhabited by Harbis and other Beduins, it possesses however the highest significance, for its practical mission has succeeded in bringing to a great extent under its leadership the sons of the desert who are refractory to all authority and are far removed from the official Islam.'[1]

[1] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the latter Part of the 19th Century*, 1931, pp. 55–6. (First published in 1888–9.)

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3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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tion were compelled to pay taxes and furnish supplies, and how forty-five of the Shaikhs of the Jawazi tribe were treacherously murdered and many of their followers massacred.[1] Generally, however, it may be said that Cyrenaica has no history, other than Bedouin traditions of inter-tribal wars, from 1051 to 1835, in which year the Turks regained control of Libya from the Caramanlis. On their return they instituted a more systematic administration than had been exercised during their earlier occupation.

The Turks returned to Cyrenaica about the time the Grand Sanusi first visited the country and eight years after their reoccupation he founded his first zawiya on the plateau. As the Sanusiya Order gained the confidence of the Bedouin and became accepted as their spokesmen, it was necessary for the Ottoman authorities to take it into consideration in their dealings with the tribes of the interior. The Order made it possible for the different tribes to express themselves politically as a unit for the first time in their relations with the outside world. The tribes provided the Order with a social system, and the Order gave to that system a political organization at a time when it was beginning to be brought into more direct contact with political forces outside tribal society.

The Sanusiya is known to have been given a Charter about 1856 by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid I. His firman was brought from Istanbul by Sidi 'Abd al-Rahim al-Maghbub, later Shaikh of the Sanusiya zawiya at Banghazi, who had been sent to Istanbul for the purpose and had the utmost difficulty, as was often the case with visitors to the Ottoman capital, in obtaining an audience with the Sultan. Whatever other privileges the firman conferred on the Order—I have not seen the document—it certainly exempted its properties from taxation and permitted it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. A second firman was issued later by Sultan 'Abd al-Majid's brother, Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz, and was brought from Istanbul to the Governor of Tripoli by Sidi Abu al-Qasim al-'Isawi, 'Abd al-Rahim's successor in the Banghazi lodge. There is in the Land Registry at Banghazi a letter from the Governor of Tripoli to the Governor of Banghazi giving the essence of this firman. It confirms the privileges granted by the earlier firman and adds to them that

[1] Op. cit., *passim* and p. 220 seq.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911–17)

I

I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from 1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner I indicate forthwith.

For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental, or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period of time all the segments of the society should find themselves in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of opposition to some political group outside them which has a different kind of political structure and belongs to a different political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis* this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself. The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took on the political form of the European countries into the orbit of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural relations with the states of Europe on the model of the European state.

When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Accord of al-Rajma. But the Italians were not yet ready to break with him finally, not wishing to compromise the operations they were carrying out in Tripolitania. They therefore started new discussions, conducted in person by Amendola, the Minister for the Colonies, who, on his return to Italy, expressed satisfaction with the talks and confidence in the Amir, neither of which he could have felt. In Mondaini's opinion the Government's policy of continuing to treat with the Sanusiya at so late a stage was consistent and, in the circumstances, wise, for it was believed that the greed for lucre and honours so unashamedly displayed by members of the Amir's family would bring them into disrepute among the Arabs, while the Government would be able to organize under its administration the zone of the plateau nearest its coastal bases and thus prepare for its penetration into the interior. In defence of Amendola's policy, later subjected to much criticism,[1] Mondaini further observes that the Fascist Government itself delayed action till the spring of 1923 when the Tripolitanian rebellion had been crushed.[2]

Concessions certainly did not lessen tension. The Italians felt that the Sanusiya was using the 'Mixed Camps' as a medium for anti-Italian propaganda, as indeed they were, not only through their official representatives in the camps but also through persons not officially recognized, such as the Sanusiya Shaikhs 'Umar al-Mukhtar, Salih al-'Awwami, and Khalid al-Humri; and they suspected that Shaikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Isawi had been sent by the Amir into the Misurata region to act as his liaison with the insurgents there. The Amir had selected for his personal advisers the most recalcitrant of the zawiya Shaikhs. They further accused the Order of responsibility for certain incidents which happened in the late summer of 1922: an attack on an Italian postal car near al-Zawiya al-Baida and the firing of some Italian property at al-Zuwaitina. Rome, said to have been misled by 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, blamed the local government for these incidents and appointed a new Governor who made a further, and as it turned out final, gesture of conciliation by paying to the Amir the remainder of the money owing to him under the Accord of al-Rajma. But nothing could brake the wheels now. Already in August the Committee elected

[1] Giglio, op. cit., p. 99.

[2] Mondaini, op. cit., p. 475.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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not male names are used, is assumed; and secondly that the Bedouin are polygamous. If, then, half-brother differentiation or full sibling unity is to be shown genealogically, the obvious way in which this can be done is to use a maternal name in the genealogy. Thus, in the Cyrenaican genealogy, a number of tribal groups will be shown as sons of a particular father. If differentiation of these groups needs to be shown, this can be effected by clustering the groups round, say, two female names (the names of the respective mothers) thereby making the two clusters of groups stand in the relationship of paternal half brothers. The concept of the 'one womb', of maternal origin, is a critical one in the context of social cohesion, but it does not deny patriliny; on the contrary, it serves in a sense to reinforce it. Female names can be used to show a greater notion of cohesion than the mere use of male names, and the significance of a female name placed at the apex of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that it is the symbol of full brother unity at the highest political level.

The founding ancestress Sa'ada is credited with two sons, who in turn are considered to be the founding ancestors of the two largest groups of tribes in Cyrenaica. Each of these sons is said to have begottten two sons, as shown on the accompanying genealogy. The next generation shows a total of nine names, and these nine ancestors are considered to be the founding ancestors of the nine noble tribes of Cyrenaica.[2] Continuing the line of descent of one of these tribes—the Magharba—the same pattern of segmentation repeats itself: the tribe is divided into two primary sections having ar-Ra'aid and ash-Shamakh as the respective founding ancestors. Ash-Shamakh is said to have had four sons, and these are the founding ancestors of four secondary sections. These latter four are credited with a varying number of sons, as shown in the genealogy (Fig. 18-1).

One feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy immediately stands out from this brief description: the uniformity in the number of segments at the various levels of segmentation. Along the line of descent from Sa'ada to Nasr, the number of sons shown in the

[2] One of these, the 'Ailat Fayid, now only numbers about 150 souls, and although it is given the structural position of a tribe in the genealogy, it scarcely merits this distinction in practice.

The Proliferation of Segments

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

FIG. 18-1 GENEALOGY 1. The names given in this genealogy are the tribal names in use. All are derivatives of personal names of ancestors, like all tribal names, except for some nicknames (e.g. Baraghith means 'the fleas') and a few which refer to a general location (e.g. the Magharba means the 'Westerners'). [551]

first four descending generations is two. At the fifth level the number increases to four and finally, at the sixth level there characteristically occurs a marked irregularity in the number of descendants forming the founding ancestors of the tertiary sections. 173 613 619

Another feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy is that its branches show an intimate relationship with ecological areas. Thus, the major division into two branches stemming from Sa'ada represents the eastern and western halves of the country with associated and clear differences in ecology. Continuing the line of descent, the Jibarna and Baraghith groups of tribes occupy plain and mountain foot-hills respectively. The two Jibarna tribes in turn occupy two distinct kinds of plain. Following now the division of the Magharba tribe, its two primary sections are divided by a very conspicuous dry valley. The four secondary divisions of the Aulad ash-Shamakh primary section likewise show a relation to ecological boundaries, albeit on a smaller scale than those previously referred to, but none the less important in this more local context. Finally, the unevenly numbered tertiary sections which are derived from these four 613 619 13 182

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secondary sections, in their very unevenness, show a more sensitive relation to more detailed ecological differences.

At all levels of segmentation, therefore, a high degree of consistency between the ecological divisions of the country and the genealogical divisions can be shown. Indeed the relationship is so close that it is tempting to consider the contemporary pattern of things as the only one possible. What historical evidence exists is against such a view being taken. It is known that tribes [167] have been displaced in the past, some of them or sections of them having been pushed out into Egypt, and others having altered their position. This being so, there obviously cannot be any finality about the present distribution of tribes in relation to the ecological divisions of the country. Rather, the existing pattern is one of a number of possible permutations. Again, as the relation between groups of people to their environment becomes progressively sensitive with the decrease in the size and order of the group, then the more unstable will be the relationship between the two. Conversely the greater the size and order of the group the more persistent will be its relationship to the ecology. In other words, the major ecological divisions are more fundamental in their effect on the way of life and the economy of people, whereas the more detailed ecological differences between, say, tertiary sections have a relatively minor effect. The [233] ecological differences between the wooded plateau area with [433] its cow and goat herding economy, and the arid semi-desert area with its camel and sheep herding economy has a much more profound effect on the general way of life, and is a more persistent division, than that which exists between two tertiary sections where the differences may only be in topographical details.

While therefore, the division of people into groups of various sorts is not permanently fixed in relation to ecological divisions, there is always an intimate relationship between the two which is progressively more enduring as the order of the structural segment increases. Yet even this statement of the relationship, guarded as it is, does not suffice, for the pattern and distribution of tribes and their sections at any given moment are not only a function of ecology, but they are also the result of a number of other complex factors which may be operating to reinforce or to

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complicate the more direct relationship of the distribution of groups of people to the ecology.[3]

The Cyrenaican genealogy, then, is a conceptualization of a hierarchy[4] of ordered territorial segments. The groups stemming from the ancestor at the third order of segmentation are referred to as tribes, and each tribe is the apex of a three-tiered order of segments, which, following customary practice, are referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary. The latter, the tertiary segment, represents the group of people who, for a period of six to eight months, gather together and live in what, for all intents and purposes, is a single discrete residential group.[5] This tertiary group is also the smallest political group. It has its own homeland, with its water supplies, pastures, and ploughland. In this homeland live most of its members. It is a lineage segment, and most of the agnates of this segment live on their own homeland.[6] It is also the vengeance group, which means that any one of its members can be killed in vengeance for a homicide committed by any other, and that the obligation to exact vengeance falls on all members alike, regardless of relationship to the victim. Likewise, its members pay blood money as a group, and although when they receive it, a bigger portion goes to the nearest agnate of the victim, the remainder is distributed equally among all its members. The number of generations which supervene between the founding ancestor of a tertiary segment and the living is usually four or five, but there is little consistency in this number. Some tertiary

[3] This part of the discussion is necessarily brief, but further amplification will appear in two subsequent articles now in preparation, one of which is concerned with a general treatment of Cyrenaican genealogies, and the other with a discussion of the effects of ecology on the social organization of the Bedouin.

[4] I use the word hierarchy here since, although segments of any order display many like features, the orders represent distinct and progressively more embracing interests, and these differences are of such consequence that to consider one order of groups as a facsimile of a superior or inferior order can only lead to confusion. A tertiary group, that is to say, may possess many of the characteristics of a secondary group, but the one is a fundamentally different sort of group from the other, as I shall show in my forthcoming article on the feud. (cf. Smith, M. G. 1956.)

[5] This statement does not apply to the Darsa and the Hasa tribes, two of the plateau tribes in Cyrenaica. The statements in this article are confined almost exclusively to the camel herders of the semi-desert.

[6] This, admittedly, is too general a statement to make about such an important issue, but I would prefer to leave its documentation and precision for an article on the analysis of the composition of Bedouin camps.

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cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard. In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages. Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support even this very general assumption, since it is known that there have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

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Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

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At the next level of segmentation (this now being the tertiary order in any given tribe) the number of segments which appear is conspicuously irregular. For the Magharba tribe, the four secondary segments, 'Ali, Mansur, Subh and Nasr are divided into thirteen, six, four, and four segments respectively. Similar irregularity appears in other tribes.[11] The pattern of the genealogy is always one of regularity in the number of segments at all points in it except for the point of tertiary segmentation where conspicuous irregularity becomes immediately evident. Since these segments constitute the summer camps of the Bedouin, this is not surprising, for these small groups will show greater susceptibility to details of local water supplies, pasturing facilities, ploughland areas, and topographical features than would the numerically larger and structurally superior groups occupying larger areas of territories of greater ecological importance. If we follow the line from Sa'ada to Nasr again, the bifurcation at the first order of segmentation is consistent with the division of the country into the permanently green high altitudes of the plateau, and the extended low-lying plain area of the western half of the country. Between the territory of the Magharba tribe ('The White Plain') and that of its neighbour tribe, the 'Awaqir ('The Red Plain'), there is a major soil difference, which is such a conspicuous feature of the landscape, and so sharply defined, that one is almost aware when one has crossed the tribal boundary. Within the Magharba tribe, a prominent dry river valley cuts the territory in two, the landscape to the west of it being characteristically serrated, making travel in an east-west direction difficult, while to the east the landscape is much more docile and undulating. The four sections of the ash-Shamakh branch again represent four quite distinct areas. The territory of one section is almost conterminous with the narrow belt of sand dunes along the coast; the territory of another is a block of rough and tumbled land in the west; the territory of a third, in the centre, is made up of a few low-lying shallow valleys; and the territory of the fourth,

[11] It is necessary here to warn the reader that, brilliant an ethnographer as Agostini undoubtedly was, his grouping of tribal sections is not always correct. I had his book (Agostini 1922–23) with me in the field and checked his tribal survey. I found that at several important points his ordering of the segments was incorrect. I should add that the differences between Agostini and myself are not due to the kind of changes discussed in this article.

stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and the population aggregates supported on these territories run from over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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attached somewhere along the line, to attach it to one of these names. Bedouin welcome, as members of their camps, practically anyone who wishes to join, even, in the case of one group, an Italian. The limit to this acceptance of members is, of course, the number of people who can be supported by the local resources. If people are being admitted freely to membership of a particular camp, this means that there is a local surplus of land and water, so that the number of grafts being supported by any particular section is a useful index of the extent to which the resources are being used. Conversely, as sometimes happens when grafted elements become numerous, or when the water supply, for various reasons, dwindles, it may be necessary to detach a grafted group. Such action is always the occasion of a violent dispute, usually over watering rights, and not infrequently fights break out. Whether or not the grafted group wins, from then onwards it will be forced to exist as an independent group, and a new tertiary section will have been born. No matter which of the processes involving grafts is considered—incorporation or detachment—both are contained within the framework of the tertiary section, without any effect on the rest of the structure.

The position of the clients, in the context of this discussion, is not unlike that of the grafts. Briefly, clients are men who are considered to have originated from a country other than Cyrenaica, and who for this reason cannot claim rights to land and water—at least this is the theory, although in some circumstances they are able to do so successfully. They are of various kinds, but they are not included in the genealogies given by the free-born. Clients are found grouped in two main ways. There are some large groups which constitute tribes in the sense that they display a genealogical and territorial organization like those of the free-born, and are usually to be found flanking the main tribes of the country on their borders. Some of these are powerful groups and enjoy considerable independence of action, but whatever their characteristics they none the less speak of themselves as 'for' or tied to the noble tribe whose territory includes theirs. Further, the sections of these client tribes have their special ties with tertiary sections of the noble tribes, which are not merely ties of sentiment, but which take the form of valuable mutual help in a number of situations. A whole client tribe, in the sense that it is

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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occupying territory which cannot be said to belong to any particular section of their noble patron tribe, is tied to the patron tribe as such. Yet it is through the small tertiary segments that these ties are made effective. In this sense, a client tribe is a combination of small groups of people each group having specific relationships with defined tertiary sections, and participating in the tribe of their patrons through these relationships.

Secondly, clients are found distributed in small groups, sometimes no more than one or two men, but often in clusters large enough to compose a small camp. Practically all tertiary sections of the noble tribes have some clients either living with them or sharing their resources. While clients continue to reside with a particular tertiary section, it is the members of the latter who are responsible for them and vice versa. If, for example, one of the clients commits a homicide, the gathering of blood-money is the responsibility of the noble tertiary section to which he is attached, and vengeance can be exacted on any member of the noble section. In other circumstances, when the offender is a nobleman, then the clients of his group are the first to be approached for blood-money. Tied in this way to a particular tertiary section, they are not, however, compelled to reside with its members permanently. On the contrary, they may be forced to move. If, for example, there is a pressure on local water supplies, the first to feel it are the clients. Annually, they supplicate for the use of water, and if their patrons decide that there is insufficient to meet all needs, the request is refused, albeit reluctantly. Clients constitute a socially mobile group; they are the pawns in the annual readjustment of men to their resources. Whenever they move, they pass on to another tertiary section, which may be a collateral section of the one they have left or structurally far removed from it, but as soon as they leave one, their duties and obligations cease and are taken up anew with another structurally like group. It is because their attachment is to a tertiary section, and not to one of superior order, that they can be as socially mobile as they are, which in turn facilitates a more efficient adjustment to the ecological situation from year to year.

Small groups of clients move frequently, groups of adopted people less frequently, and groups composed of the free-born

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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change their structural position only rarely. The latter change sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stemming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation, taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the manner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

[12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Haiba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Haiba. See also note 11.

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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621 613 628 682 hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point. What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of 621 restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as 613 they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate 628 relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The 682 payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt, 571 there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this •182 which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships.[1] As the debt of blood money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

613 628 682 The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

619 613 [133] [132] [221] Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is [582] immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

[1] This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. As yet, the son does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement, and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927.

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.

between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before. In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

Rites de passage are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible. Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.[4] It is true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

[4] See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

membership of associations and so on. The statuses a Bedouin achieves depend not on an ordered acquisition through the inheritance of roles or election to them, but on his personal manipulation of linkages in his jockeying with others. Rites are minimal because there are few defined statuses an individual can predictably acquire. The equalitarianism of the desert denudes the Bedouin of ritual riches. Complimentarily, rites which do occur are thrown into exaggerated relief by the absence of others, and in their isolation, become not merely a "passage" but a cataclysmic change. Marriage and burial both comprehend limited fields of relations, but accompanying ceremonies may bring several hundred people together, people who otherwise rarely gather in these numbers to meet one another as kinsmen and neighbours, and it is suggested that the emphasis given to the events dramatises the significance of the changes they produce. In the discussion of the changes brought about by marriage, the Bedouin view of what is entailed will be considered first.

The Bedouin View of Marriage

After marriage, the Bedouin argue, a son has a tent of his own, a woman over whom he has authority and soon children to make him a father. Marriage causes split, branching. A new family is created, holding the potential of a new lineage. The separation is so painful a matter for the father that he cannot contemplate it, hence his pretence that he has no knowledge of wedding festivities, and his subsequent attitude that nothing has happened.

Interestingly, there are two other occasions when this attitude is to be observed. When a man kills within his corporate group,[5] he may flee his tribe or he may be compelled to leave; later he is likely to return and, when he does, he is received with a minimum of show. Every attempt is made to suppress knowledge of the event.

Again, if incest occurs, the memory of it must somehow be suppressed, and it is an ever-present danger. Men, permitted four wives simultaneously and also able to engage in a plurality of marriages through divorce or death of spouses, may have children showing an age difference of two or three generations. Thus it comes about that a man may be of an age in relation to his father's sister which permits them as children to behave as if they were first paternal cousins. As an adult, the preferred spouse for a man is a father's brother's daughter. In terms of relationships between adolescents the situation in which a man is of the same age generation as his father's sister is fraught with danger. In one such case, between a man and his father's sister, the male child of the union was put out in the desert to be

[5] Bedouin are disposed in groups which, in summer, usually constitute a single community, around or near a watering point. The men of this group are interlinked by reference to an ancestor four or five ascending generations, reckoning from the generation of men of about 20 years. When, elsewhere in this chapter reference is made to corporations, it will be to groups of this kind.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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daughters of agnates and, in view of the high agnatic concentration, the daughters of agnates who are co-residents as well. Parallel-cousin marriage therefore creates affinity between co-resident agnates. 582 602

The rate of parallel-cousin marriage is high, producing such a density of kinship relationships as to afford a reliable index for defining the agnatic corporation. As a form of marriage it persists; genealogical records clearly demonstrate this. Frequency of parallel-cousin marriage taken together with its persistency, means, above all else, that it makes an agnatic group a cognatic group as well. The matter is put in this way to suit the general development of the argument, but it would be a serious error to think that this means I am giving priority to agnation and that I am considering cognation as intrusive, or that, in this society, agnation can stand on its own because it has a kind of absolute significance other forms of relationship do not possess. Both forms exist in reality.

The great Bu Bakr of Cyrenaica's most celebrated lineage is alleged to have exhorted his fellow tribesmen to "marry your father's brother's daughters and then your paternal relatives and your maternal relatives will become one." Whether he had given the advice or not, the Bedouin, as their society is constituted, would marry them anyway. The Bedouin form of agnation without its accompanying parallel-cousin marriage would impose impossible restrictions, if indeed there is any point in attempting to conceive of a situation so remote from reality. With parallel-cousin marriage present in the corporate group, men referred to as agnates are not agnates only; each and every one of them is the centre of a bundle of roles, each role potentially as important as the other. It would be false to argue, moreover, that complexities of relationships can be unravelled by analytically separating them, giving precedence to the agnatic role in an "agnatic" situation, the mother's brother's role in a domestic situation and so on. An agnate who is also a mother's brother is never the same, in any situation, as an agnate to whom one is not otherwise related. The prime significance of parallel-cousin marriage is that it creates a complexity of linkages which almost amount to confusion, thereby maximising the choice available to individuals to meet whatever contingencies befall them. [613] [613] [554] [182]

The only area of relationships left relatively undisturbed by parallel-cousin marriage is the son, father and father's brother triangle. Freed of the complications stemming from parallel-cousin marriage, agnation can here approximate its true form. Other complications arise out of marriage. A few are listed here: father and son marry a mother and her daughter; a form of exchange marriage between first parallel-cousins occur; two brothers marry two sisters; the marriage of two brothers to two sisters is followed, in the succeeding generation, by the son of one union marrying the daughter of the other, making this latter a double first parallel-cousin marriage — both a father's brother's daughter's and a mother's sister's daughter's marriage. These forms can all occur within a corporate group. No citadel of agnation can withstand this attack. All forms of marriage combine to break the grip 582 583 [613] [602]

age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent[12] of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his co-residents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

[12] As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.

would be impossible to satisfy all marriage expectations of men within the universe of the minimal tribal section. For this reason alone external links are inevitable and persistent. Also, the small territorial strip such a group claims as a homeland produces an economy which, in this environment, is unstable. Additional security is gained by making connections with other tribal sections, each with its specific ecological character. Men also marry into their client groups. The proportion of these for this camp was 9 per cent of the total. From these links they gain economic advantages, they can claim services and a client-following is politically significant. Finally, 7 per cent of the total[13] are marriages with women of other tribes, which again not only reduces the instability of the economy (in that a large tribal area suffering near-famine conditions has access to areas of markedly different ecology), but also provides political connections for men whose power ambitions have passed the point of leadership limited to their own tribes. In one way or another all these interests are manifest in the small camp and attention is now directed to the latter.

The disposition of people in the camp is represented diagrammatically on the page following.

The nucleus of the camp is Tent A. Its owner (1) was a powerful *Shaikh*, the son of a famous father. His marriage represents a political link with a group of one of the primary sections of his own tribe. His father died only a few years before I recorded my census, and the large amount of moveable property he left had still not been divided among the sons; the owner of the tent, as eldest brother, still controlled the flocks and herds. Most of his time he spent away from the camp engaging in political intrigue. His two younger brothers lived in his tent, but the second (5) would not remain there long because negotiations for his marriage had been started. His father (2) married a parallel cousin; she died and shortly afterwards he took her sister (3) in sororal union. When this occurred an amount of bride-wealth was agreed, but instead of giving any of it to her father, the entire amount was "put in front of her" (that is, the animals were allowed to remain with her husband's flock), and these animals she had marked with her brother's tribal sign to distinguish them from those of her husband. It was widely known that she was going to leave these animals to her husband's second son, for although she could not transfer them to a male outside her husband's corporate group, she could decide who, among his heirs, should inherit.

During my stay in this camp, her brother's son (4) came to it as a temporary resident for a month. Since he was poor, the purpose of his visit was to capture some of his aunt's wealth while she was still alive and the possibility still existed. During his stay he was fed well but did no work. His kinsmen found his company tiresome, so, to cut short his stay, and after consulting her nominated heir (5), she gave him three grown goats. Also when an occasion arose for an animal slaughter, she provided the sheep, and,

[13] The remainder is made up of marriages to the daughters of men incorporated into the lineages.

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
695 and on two occasions were successful in evading just decisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
• 182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.